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AIRLINES' RESPONSIBILITIES TO PASSENGERS:
RECENT THEORIES AND EXTENSIONS
F. LEE CAMPBELL*
As technological developments continue to shrink the globe,
and air transportation becomes increasingly available to substantial
numbers of people, the problems inherent in a rapidly developing,
consumer-oriented industry expand proportionately. Recent head-
lines have described diverse air transportation disputes ranging
from the advisability of landing the Anglo-French Concorde in
the United States to the feasibility of a space shuttle system.
Other less sensational stories, however, have had more substan-
tive impact on air transportation in general and on the relationship
between the air carrier and its passengers in particular.
The scope and effect of recent decisions affecting the air carrier-
passenger relationship have been widespread and far reaching.
Some of these decisions have not factually involved the air indus-
try; however, they will likely have a profound impact on the field
of transportation.' Other decisions have involved issues of law
which have long been the subject of controversy within the indus-
try.' Still others have involved new problems.'
* J.D., University of Washington, 1950. Mr. Campbell is Past President of
the Washington Association of Defense Counsel and former Chairman of the
Aerospace Committee of Defense Research Institute. Mr. Campbell is currently
involved in general aviation legal work and is President-Elect of the Seattle-King
County Bar Association.
I For example, the recognition of the tort of negligent infliction of mental dis-
tress by some courts constitutes an expanded theory of liability which will affect
the aviation industry. See, e.g., Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wash. 2d 424, 553 P.2d
1096 (1976); Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 334 N.E.2d 590, 372 N.Y.S.2d
638 (1975).
'Cases continue to arise in which tariffs are summarily upheld. See, e.g.,
Randall v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Ark. 1975); Kapner
v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 13 Av. Cas. 18,228 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976). This
rule is not without exception, however, and occasionally courts hold that tariffs
amount to an impermissible exculpation from liability. See, e.g., Rodriguez v.
American Airlines, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 78 (D.P.R. 1974); Davis v. Northeast
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Because of the number of air industry-related cases and the
limitations of space and time, this article will not explore the
ramifications of all such decisions. Rather, it will focus principally
upon two areas which pose among the most profound and imme-
diate concerns for the aviation industry regarding passenger rela-
tions. First, it will examine the many implications of the various
decisions in Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc.4-the "bumping"
opinions. The Nader case, as it progressed from federal district
court to the United States Supreme Court, presented a myriad of
issues with potentially far-ranging repercussions. Because of the
number and breadth of these topics, the Nader decisions will serve
as a springboard for discussion of other opinions which involve
related issues, especially the question of private remedies under
the Federal Aviation Act (the "Act").' Second, this article will
examine a number of recent decisions involving extensions of the
duty of air carriers to passengers beyond the confines of the air-
craft. These cases, under both the common law and the provisions
of the Warsaw Convention, portend a continued expansion, or at
least a refinement, of the duty of air carriers to their passengers.
I. THE NADER DECISION, OVERSALES, AND DENIED
BOARDING COMPENSATION
Over the years, air carriers have utilized a number of approaches
attempting to minimize the losses resulting from booked but un-
occupied seats.' At present, the industry engages in calculated over-
Airlines, Inc., 116 N.H. 429, 362 A.2d 208 (1976). See generally Pratt, Tariff
Limitations on Air Carriage Contracts, 29 J. AIR L. & COM. 14 (1963).
' An interesting example of a new problem which tangentially involves carrier-
passenger relations is Condit v. United Airlines, Inc., [1976] 3 Av. L. REP. (14
Av. Cas.) (CCH) 17,343 (E.D. Va. 1976). The Condit court rejected a claim
of sex discrimination in a Title VII action brought by a stewardess who was
grounded because she was pregnant. The court upheld the airline's requirement as
reasonable because it constituted a bona fide occupational qualification and was
justified because of the air carrier's duty to provide the highest possible degree of
care for its passengers.
4365 F. Supp. 128 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd, 512 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
rev'd, 426 U.S. 290 (1976).
5 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1301
et seq. (1970 & Supp. V 1975), formerly Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601,
52 Stat. 973.
' This problem of "oversales" can result from a number of causes: (1) the
substitution of a lower capacity aircraft; (2) personnel errors made by the car-
1977] AIRLINES' RESPONSIBILITIES
booking based upon statistical analysis of past experience.! In the
main, this flexible booking system has advantages for both the
carriers and their passengers: the former can realize the economic
consequences of full-boarding, while the latter can recognize
greater flexibility by shifting travel plans without penalty. The
danger of such overbooking based upon statistical analysis, how-
ever, is manifest-not every flight accurately reflects its statistical
projection, and an oversales situation can occur.' Thus, passengers
with confirmed reservations sometimes cannot be accommodated.
They are "bumped."
In seeking to balance the interests of air carriers with those of
their passengers, the Civil Aeronautics Board (the "CAB"), pur-
suant to its rulemaking authority, has recognized the viability of
oversales. It has also established a denied boarding compensation
procedure to recompense the bumped passenger." These rules pro-
vide, inter alia: (1) each air carrier must establish written priority
rier or travel agent; (3) breakdowns or defects in communications, computers,
and other equipment used in processing reservations; (4) reservation practices
such as "free sales" or "blocked ticketing"; (5) no shows. See 34 J. AIR L. &
COM. 127 (1968). On a number of occasions the CAB has implemented pro-
grams to alleviate the problem, including penalties, service charges, ticketing time
limits, and reconfirmation requirements. Problems with passenger resentment and
enforcement have necessitated abandonment of these programs. See Nader v.
Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 512 F.2d at 534. See generally 34 J. Am L. & CoM.
127 (1968).
7See Priority Rules, Denied Boarding Compensation Tariffs, and Reports of
Unaccommodated Passengers: Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 32 Fed. Reg.
459 (1967); Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 512 F.2d at 533-34.
8 This was recognized by both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court
in Nader. See 12 F.2d at 534; 426 U.S. at 294.
9 In statistical terms, the number of oversales is small-6.0 passengers denied
confirmed space per 10,000 enplanements in fiscal year 1975. See Priority Rules,
Denied-Boarding Compensation Tariffs And Reports Of Unaccommodated Pas-
sengers: Re-examination of the Board's Policies Concerning Deliberate Over-
booking and Oversales, 41 Fed. Reg. 16,478 (1976). As both the Court of Ap-
peals and the Supreme Court noted, however, the absolute number of passengers
is substantial: 82,000 passengers in 1972, and 76,000 passengers in 1973 were
bumped. 512 F.2d at 534; 426 U.S. at 294. It should be noted that the discussion
herein does not involve bumping resulting from government acquisition of space
or other operational or safety reasons. 14 C.F.R. § 250.6(a) (1977). See Stough
v. North Central Airlines, Inc., 55 Ill. App. 2d 338, 204 N.E.2d 792 (1965).
Additionally, the focus is not on claimed damages arising from bumping where
the airline acts on the basis of an FBI report, Williams v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 509 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1975), or on denied seating because the passenger's
proffered check cannot be negotiated because of insufficient funds, Marshall v.
Delta Airlines, Inc., 13 Av. Cas. 18,164 (D.D.C. 1975).
0 14 C.F.R. Part 250 (1977).
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rules and criteria for determining which passengers holding con-
firmed reservations shall be denied boarding on an oversold flight;
(2) the carrier must file a tariff providing for compensation to
such passengers; (3) pursuant to the filed tariff, the carrier must
tender "denied boarding compensation" in a prescribed amount
to those denied passage as well as a written explanation of the
terms, conditions, and limitations of the compensation; and (4)
.the carrier must file a report with the CAB specifying the number
of passengers boarded and the number not accommodated.
The existence of the CAB procedure, however, has not solved
the oversales problem. For many years courts have been con-
fronted with claims of passengers who refused the proffered com-
pensation and thereafter sued for damages. While acceptance of
denied boarding compensation or alternative routing constitutes
liquidated damages,1 cases have recognized a right to recover com-
pensatory and, in some cases, punitive damages where the regula-
tory remedy was rejected." These decisions raised important ques-
tions regarding the bases and scope of such relief. Many of these
questions have been addressed by the opinions involved in the
Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc. litigation. Following a brief sum-
mary of the facts underlying the controversy, this article will ex-
amine these issues and their effect on airline-passenger relations.
1 14 C.F.R. S 250.7 (1977) provides that appropriately tendered denied
boarding compensation which is accepted by the passenger constitutes liquidated
damages. Section 250.6(b) provides that the arrangement of comparable air
transportation which is accepted by the passenger precludes eligibility for denied
boarding compensation. In Rousseff v. Western Airlines, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 1262
(C.D. Cal. 1976), the court held that the acceptance of alternative transportation
which gets the passenger to his destination within two hours of his originally
scheduled flight, as required by § 250.6(b), leaves him with no remedy at law
because it constitutes liquidated damages.
12 In several early decisions prior to the promulgation of the denied boarding
compensation regulations, the passenger's claims were predicated on breach of
contract, and recovery was limited to compensatory damages, i.e., ticket price
plus any excess baggage charge paid. See, e.g., National Airlines, Inc. v. Allsopp,
182 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1950); Trammell v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 136 F. Supp.
75 (W.D.S.C. 1955); Jones v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 22 Wash. 2d 863, 157
P.2d 728 (1945). In Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360 (S.D.
Cal. 1961), the first decision recognizing a private cause of action under
§ 404(b) in favor of the bumped passenger, the court awarded punitive damages.
In Mortimer v. Delta Air Lines, 302 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. Ill. 1969), the court
specifically held that the existence of the CAB regulations did not preclude a
private action, including a claim for punitive damages. For a more thorough
discussion of the punitive damages issue, see Part I C infra.
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A. Background of the Nader Controversy
In April 1972, the well-known consumer advocate Ralph Nader
booked passage on an Allegheny Airlines flight from Washington,
D.C. to Hartford in order to make appearances on behalf of a
Connecticut public interest group (CCAG). Nader made a con-
firmed reservation three days before the scheduled departure and
obtained his ticket from a travel agent on the morning of the flight.
Arriving five minutes before the scheduled departure, he and two
other confirmed passengers were informed that the flight was full.
The two others accepted alternative connections arranged by
Allegheny, but Nader refused. He then flew to Boston and drove
to Connecticut, missing one of his two scheduled appearances. As
a result of his failure to obtain a seat, Nader and CCAG brought
suit in the federal district court in Washington, D.C., seeking
compensatory and punitive damages, under two theories: violation
of section 404 of the Federal Aviation Acf' and common-law mis-
representation. The trial court found for plaintiff Nader and
awarded him nominal compensatory damages plus $25,000.00
punitive damages. The court dismissed plaintiff CCAG's claim for
lost contributions resulting from Nader's absence as too specula-
tive; however, it awarded nominal compensatory damages and
$25,000.00 punitive damages to the group.1"
The district court's resolution of the issues presented in Nader
raised the spectre of a quantum extension of airline liability in the
case of a bumped passenger. The court was asked to resolve a
number of potentially far-reaching questions-the exclusivity of
the CAB denied boarding compensation procedure, the viability of
a private common-law remedy pursuant to section 404 of the Act,
the efficacy of actions by nonpassengers, and the right to recover
both compensatory and punitive damages for bumping. On each
"Section 404(b), 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1970), provides:
No air carrier or foreign air carrier shall make, give, or cause any
undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular
person, port, locality, or description of traffic in air transportation
in any respect whatsoever or subject any particular person, port,
locality, or description of traffic in air transportation to any unjust
discrimination or any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disad-
vantage in any respect whatsoever.
"Nader's award was based on Allegheny's culpability both for violation of
404(b) and common-law misrepresentation. CCAG's award apparently was
premised only on the basis of the common-law claim. 365 F. Supp. at 132-33.
1977]
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issue, the trial court responded in favor of the plaintiffs."
The shock attendant to the trial court's determination in Nader
has been ameliorated somewhat by the subsequent decisions of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and
the United States Supreme Court. It is this subsequent evolution
in the Nader controversy and other recent related decisions which
this article now will examine.
B. The Section 404(b) Remedy for the Bumped Passenger
1. Existence of the Private Remedy
The Federal Aviation Act does not prescribe private remedies for
violations of its provisions. Nevertheless, on several occasions
appellate courts have found that a private damage action can exist
for a passenger denied boarding while holding a confirmed reser-
vation on the basis that this constitutes unjust discrimination under
section 404(b)."° Indeed, in the court of appeals decision, the
Nader court stated that this conclusion is "well settled."
7
The summary conclusion that a private cause of action exists,
while consistent with the opinions cited by the Nader court, de-
serves more attention than it was given by the district court. While
precedent exists for the conclusion, it is not patently supported by
the provision itself or the legislative history behind it. Section 404
is entitled "Rates for Carriage of Persons and Property," and it is
contained within Subchapter 4 of the Act, entitled "Air Carrier
Economic Regulation." In one of the early decisions regarding
the existence of a private remedy under this provision, a federal
district court noted that the pivotal language, "unjust discrimina-
tion" and "undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage," are
not explained in the Act or by the congressional debates.' Thus,
there is nothing to suggest that Congress intended anything other
' For a discussion of the effect of the Nader district court decision on dis-
criminatory bumping, see 40 J. Am L. & COM. 533 (1974).
"1 See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 229 F.2d 499 (2d
Cir. 1956); Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Cal.
1961); Mortimer v. Delta Airlines, 302 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. 11. 1969); Archibald
v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 460 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1972); Kaplan v. Luf-
thansa German Airlines, 12 Av. Cas. 17,933 (E.D. Pa. 1973). This conclusion
does not mean, however, that all provisions of the Act create private remedies.
See Part II inira.
17 512 F.2d at 537.
1' Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360, 363 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
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than the proscription of rate differentials between persons under
this section.19 A snowball effect, however, has resulted in the recog-
nition of a private remedy in the context of oversales
2. The Prima Facie Case, and the Burden of Proof
The conclusion that a remedy exists under section 404 does not
lead inexorably to a plaintiff's recovery. The plaintiff must still
establish the requisite elements of a violation. The determination
of these elements and the appropriate allocation of proof have
proved bothersome problems for the courts.
Examining the requirements of a prima facie case, the court of
appeals in Nader followed the example of the Ninth Circuit in
Archibald v. Pan American Airways, Inc.,"1 and concluded that
intentional overbooking does not constitute a per se violation of
section 404(b) so as to entitle the claimant to an automatic judg-
ment. Conversely, the Nader court's rejection of the per se viola-
tion approach did not exculpate the airlines. The trial court had
indicated that the determinative factor in justifying bumping was
the reasonableness of the airlines action.' The court of appeals,
however, rejected this position, and indicated that the determi-
native considerations are whether the airline's priority rules con-
1941 J. Am L. & CoM. 119, 121 (1975).
20The first decision to imply a private remedy under S 404(b) in an over-
sales situation was Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360 (S.D.
Cal. 1961). The Wills court looked to the purpose of the Act and concluded that
judicial intervention was necessary to redress past violations of the Act inasmuch
as the provisions themselves provided only prospective relief under the CAB's
auspices and inasmuch as state remedies were inadequate. The court indicated
that refusing to imply such relief would mean that the rights of the affected pas-
senger would be "robbed of vitality." Id. at 364. The court reflected its underlying
attitude in stating that the judiciary in such circumstances must be alert to adjust
remedies to redress invasions of federally protected rights even where the ap-
plicable provisions do not provide a private remedy. Id. at 364-65. Compare this
attitude and language with the criteria enumerated by the United States Supreme
Court in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), as applied in Polansky v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 523 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1975), Wolf v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
544 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1976), and Mason v. Belieu, 543 F.2d 215 (D.C. Cir.
1976). Cases subsequent to the Wills decision dealing with oversales have sum-
marily concluded that a private cause of action exists, usually by mere citation.
See cases cited at note 16 supra.
21460 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1972).
S365 F. Supp. at 132. The broad reasonableness standard utilized by the
Nader trial court conformed to the approach utilized by the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals in Archibald v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 460 F.2d 14, 16-17
(9th Cir. 1972).
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form to the requirements of the CAB regulations and whether they
were followed. 3
The court of appeals in Nader went one step further. It indicated
that the plaintiff must go forward with evidence showing that the
carrier failed to honor his priority.' The court held that the burden
of proof then shifts- to the carrier to establish its priority rules and
compliance therewith.' Thus, the court attempted to resolve the
evidentiary problems by shifting the burden of proof to the airline
regarding an issue presumably within its sphere of knowledge.
This legal resolution simplifies the articulation of the appropriate
rule, but it remains to be seen whether it resolves the preexisting
confusion. This allocation of the burden of proof by the court of
appeals, which was not reviewed by the Supreme Court, appears
to leave the passenger in a position where he must still show more
than merely being bumped. He apparently must also demonstrate
that he had a particular priority which was not honored before the
court will shift the burden of proof regarding priority rules and
their compliance to the air carrier. In order to know whether or
not a person with a lower priority was in fact boarded, the claimant
must necessarily determine what the rules were.' Thus, from a
practical standpoint, he must show a violation of the rules before
the burden shifts. This fact suggests, that the Nader court's resolu-
tion of the evidentiary problem is illusory.
"The court of appeals noted that the trial court had made no reference to
the priority rules. 512 F.2d at 539.
24 The court of appeals defined the elements of the cause of action for bump-
ing as: (1) possession by the plaintiff of a designated priority, and (2) boarding
of persons with a lower priority by the carrier. Id. at 538.
25 The court stated: "Once the plaintiff proves that the carrier failed to honor
his priority, the burden of proving the priority rules and compliance therewith
shifts to the carrier." Id. In reaching this conclusion, it is not clear whether the
court intended to shift the burden of proof regarding the second element of the
prima facie case or whether it shifted the burden following proof of the prima
facie case so that compliance constitutes an affirmative defense. The context of
the court's discussion suggests the former conclusion; the above-quoted language
suggests the latter.
"' This problem may be circumvented if the Nader decision is read as adopting
the approach of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Archibald v. Pan Am.
World Airways, Inc., 460 F.2d 14 (1972), which the court cited as the basis for
its decision. Under Archibald, bumping is not a per se violation of S 404(b),
it is a prima facie violation, i.e., evidence of bumping is sufficient to shift the
burden of proof. The language quoted from the Nader Court of Appeals decision
in note 25 supra, however, appears to require proof that the carrier boarded per-
sons with a lower priority.
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From the air carrier's standpoint, the prescription of the Nader
decisions is clear regarding denied boarding procedures. First, the
airline must submit procedures to the CAB which provide a work-
able mechanism to allocate priorities. Second, and most important,
this procedure must be disseminated to those engaged in boarding
passengers and who are responsible for placating nonboarding
ticketed customers. To the extent that this two-step process is
followed, liability under Nader for violation of section 404 can be
avoided, and the putative plaintiff must pursue the alternative
course of attacking the priority system before the Civil Aeronautics
Board."
C. Bumping and Common-Law Tort Remedies
In Nader, the plaintiffs did not attack the adequacy of the
proffered compensation, nor did they seek a private remedy under
section 4112 by contending that the airline engaged in a deceptive
and unfair practice. Rather, they sued for the common-law tort of
misrepresentation in addition to the remedy discussed above. The
trial court found that Allegheny had affirmatively misrepresented
to Nader that he had a guaranteed seat.2" Further, the court allowed
both Nader and CCAG to recover because it found that both had
relied upon the representation to their detriment.2 '
The court of appeals reversed, finding that there was no evi-
dence regarding affirmative misrepresentation on the part of Alle-
gheny. In contrast, the court stated that "the gravamen of appellees'
27 The court of appeals, in rejecting the broad reasonableness test utilized by
the district court, stated: "It is beyond dispute that the reasonableness, vel non,
of Allegheny's priority rules must be determined, in the first instance, by the
Civil Aeronautics Board." 512 F.2d at 539. This conclusion reflects the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction. See note 35 intra.
28 Section 411, 49 U.S.C. § 1381 (1970), provides in pertinent part:
The Board may, upon its own initiative or upon complaint by any
air carrier, foreign air carrier, or ticket agent, if it considers that
such action by it would be in the interest of the public, investigate
and determine whether any air carrier, foreign air carrier, or ticket
agent has been or is engaged in unfair or deceptive practices or un-
fair methods of competition in air transportation or the sale thereof.
No court has recognized an implied private remedy under this section. See notes
87-88 and accompanying text infra.
29365 F. Supp. at 132.
"Id. at 131. The trial court indicated that Nader knew by previous experience
that airlines overbooked, but that such general knowledge did not make either
plaintiff aware of the practice with respect to the defendant in the case at bar.
1977]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
complaint is nonrepresentation rather than misrepresentation.""
Furthermore, the court found that the determinative question was
whether Allegheny had a duty to disclose its procedures to the
plaintiff."
Having reached this conclusion, the court of appeals took a curi-
ous detour. It indicated that determining whether a duty to dis-
close exists depends upon whether the conduct constitutes a decep-
tive practice under section 411 of the Act." The conclusion that
failure to disclose constitutes such a deceptive act means that a
positive duty to disclose exists and that the failure to meet that
duty gives rise to common-law liability.
This connection between section 411 and the determination of
a common-law duty by the court of appeals raised two important,
interrelated questions. First, the court had to determine whether
the existence of the CAB's power under section 411 precluded
common-law remedies for acts which would constitute unfair or
deceptive practices." Second, even if such a common-law action
could be maintained, the court had to determine whether the
claim should remain in abeyance pending the CAB's administra-
tive determination as to whether the particular practice constituted
a deceptive or unfair act pursuant to the primary jurisdiction
doctrine.'
The court of appeals? resolution of the first of these questions
presaged its action on the second. The court initially indicated,
analogizing to section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
31 512 F.2d at 542 (emphasis added by the court).
32 Id.
a id.
34 Allegheny and the CAB as amicus curiae argued that the CAB's power was
exclusive and precluded common-law remedies. Id. at 542.
3 The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is aimed at maintaining the proper re-
lationship between the judiciary and administrative agencies charged with par-
ticular regulatory duties. United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59 (1956).
The doctrine determines whether a court or an agency should make the initial
decision on a particular issue. This allocation is necessary in order to utilize the
expertise of the agency on a particular question, but more importantly, it is
aimed at coordinating the work of the agencies and courts. As the Supreme Court
-stated in Federal Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481, 498-99 (1958):
"The holding that the Board had primary jurisdiction, in short, was a device to
prepare the way, if the litigation should take its ultimate course, for a more in-
formed and precise determination by the Court of the scope and meaning of
-the statute as applied to those particular circumstances." See generally K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT Ch. 19 (1959).
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that Congress did not intend to eliminate common-law remedies
for fraud and deceit by incorporating section 411 into the Act."6
The court further noted, however, that unlike the Federal Trade
Commission Act, the Federal Aviation Act involved the regulation
of a system of limited competition and included substantial rate-
making power. As a result, the court concluded that Congress did
intend the Act to affect common-law actions."7 Based upon this
conclusion, the court held that the availability of common-law
remedies was coextensive with violation of section 411, i.e., only
if the CAB determined that a practice was unfair or deceptive
could an individual seek a common-law remedy. 8
Having reached the conclusion that a common-law remedy pre-
supposes finding a violation of section 411, the court found that
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction mandated that the CAB first
ascertain whether the conduct in issue in fact violated the section.'
In effect, the court indicated that the CAB could determine
whether a particular practice which might give rise to common-law
liability could be permitted in the aviation industry. Thus, while
recognizing that section 411 did not eliminate private remedies
for common-law torts, the court limited their scope to violations
of that provision as determined by the CAB.
This issue of the interface between common-law remedies and
the Federal Aviation Act was the only aspect of the Nader con-
troversy reviewed by the United States Supreme Court."0 In its
decision, the Court rejected the equation prescribed by the court
of appeals' majority and, in essence, agreed with the position of
Justice Fahy in his separate opinion."' The Supreme Court flatly
36 512 F.2d at 542-43.
3
7 Id. at 543-44. The court cited Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co.,
204 U.S. 426 (1907), a case under the Interstate Commerce Act, for the proposi-
tion that § 1106 of the Federal Aviation Act, the savings clause which provides
for the preservation of common-law remedies, should not be read literally to
allow actions inconsistent with the purpose of the Act itself.
"The court stated: "Thus, if the Board properly finds that a practice is not
deceptive, a common law action for misrepresentation must fail as a matter of
law." Id. at 544.
39 Id.
40426 U.S. 290 (1976).
41 512 F.2d at 552 (Fahy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Judge
Fahy pointed out that 5 1106 specifically states that the Act is not intended to
abridge or alter common-law remedies. Thus, he disagreed with the court's hold-
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rejected the lower court's conclusion, by stating: "[A] violation of
§ 411, contrary to the Court of Appeals' conclusion, is not coexten-
sive with a breach of duty under the common law.... No power
to immunize can be derived from the language of § 411. " Thus
the Supreme Court severed the connection created by the court of
appeals.
Having reached this conclusion, the Court found that the stand-
ards to determine fraud and misrepresentation were derived from
the common law and were not, therefore, within the peculiar ex-
pertise of the CAB. 3 The highest court reversed and remanded the
case for determination on the merits of the plaintiffs' misrepre-
sentation claims. In so doing, the Court did not express an opinion
regarding the merits of these claims, but it stated that compliance
with agency regulations is not sufficient to exempt the carrier auto-
matically from common-law liability."
The Supreme Court consequently left bumped passengers with
a double-barreled remedy. First, because the Court did not examine
the viability of a private claim under section 404(b), a plaintiff
can sue the air carrier and recover damages if he can establish
violation of the priority rules. As discussed above, however, evi-
dentiary problems involved in this cause of action remain. Second,
the passenger can sue for any common-law remedy which may be
available, even if the airline's priority rules were not violated.
As a practical matter, this will probably involve intentional or
negligent misrepresentation, although the infliction of mental dis-
tress also is a possible claim. If agents of the carrier in fact repre-
sent that a seat has been guaranteed the passenger, and he is sub-
sequently bumped, the requisite elements for establishing a prima
ing regarding that provision, and he argued that the majority authorized precisely
such abridgement.
1426 U.S. at 301-02.
'The Supreme Court stated:
Referral of the misrepresentation issue to the Board cannot be
justified by the interest in informing the court's ultimate decision
with "the expert and specialized knowledge" . . . of the Board....
The standards to be applied in an action for fraudulent misrep-
resentation are within the conventional competence of the courts,
and the judgment of a technically expert body is not likely to be
helpful in the application of these standards to the facts of this
case.
.Id. at 305-06.
"Id. at 308 n.19.
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facie case of misrepresentation should be relatively easy to establish.
If, however, there is no representation, the more typical problem of
showing a duty to disclose exists. Certainly, the issue as to the
existence of this duty will emerge as a focal point in future disputes
regarding bumped passengers.
D. Recovery By Third Persons
In many situations in which a passenger is bumped from a flight
and thereby sustains legally compensable demages, a third party
who relies upon the passenger's arrival at a specific time likewise
suffers inconvenience and potentially demonstrable damages. The
possibility of recovering damages for bumping, not only by the
passenger, but also by a stranger, poses a substantial hidden danger
to the air carrier.
This latent danger certainly became patent when the trial court
in Nader awarded CCAG compensatory damages and $25,000.00
punitive damages. The basis for the district court's conclusion
represented a stunning practical expansion of an airline's vulner-
ability in oversales situations. The court held that CCAG could
recover because it was a plaintiff who foreseeably and reasonably
relied upon the misrepresentation to Nader and was injured there-
by.' Further, because the court found sufficient intent to warrant
punitive damages vis-a-vis Nader, it awarded a similar amount to
CCAG.4
In reaching these conclusions, the court almost summarily
established that the airlines could foresee injury to CCAG. The
court justified this conclusion on two grounds. First, the court
stated that the airline has a legal duty to the public as a licensed
carrier. Additionally, the court found that its conclusion was justi-
fied because the carrier was in a better position to prevent the
problem of oversales by fully disclosing its practices.
7
Acceptance of the district court's view would mean potentially
unlimited liability to unknown plantiffs who had made plans based
upon a bumped passenger's travel arrangements.' This approach
was rejected by the court of appeals; however, in so doing, the
365 F. Supp. at 132-33.
4Id. at 133.
47 Id.
"See 40 J. Am L. & CoM. 533, 544-46 (1974).
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court failed to prescribe clear guidelines regarding the extent of
the resultant vulnerability. The court of appeals quickly recognized
the danger of vastly expanded liability inherent in the lower court's
opinion and indicated that a more circumscribed approach to
liability was required."9 The court, therefore, rejected the suggestion
that liability inheres merely because the airline reasonably could
have foreseen injury to CCAG.
The test enumerated by the court of appeals for recovery by
nonpassengers for misrepresentation is not as far-reaching as that
of the district court, but its parameters are not well-defined. The
court acknowledged that privity of contract is not required for
recovery." In seeking to define who then can recover, the court
quoted the Restatement of Torts and Dean Prosser to the effect
that mere foreseeability is insufficient to establish liability for mis-
representation to unidentified plaintiffs." The court indicated that
Nader could recover as a member of an identifiable class of third
persons-potential passengers. CCAG, however, could not recover
because it was merely a member of a vast indeterminate class that
could be equated with the public at large.
The scope of the carrier's liability to third persons was also
recently examined by the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia in Mason v. Belieu."3 The trial court in Mason had
allowed a wife whose husband had been bumped from a flight to
recover under section 404(b) for the emotional distress allegedly
suffered as the result of her husband's unexplained delay." This
conclusion meant that the court allowed a third person to recover
for discrimination against another.
4 The court of appeals stated:
[F]oreseeability is not the test to be used in determining the class of
third persons who may recover; otherwise, liability in a case such
as this could become indeterminate. To hold that CCAG is within
the class of persons who may recover would mean that virtually
any plaintiff, no matter how far removed from the transaction or
incident, can recover the full amount of his damages. We are un-
willing to extend liability that far ....
512 F.2d at 549.
80 Id. at 547.
51 Id. at 548.
5, Id. at 548-49.
63 543 F.2d 215 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
" 13 Av. Cas. 17,114 (D.D.C. 1974). See 41 J. Ant L. & CoM. 119 (1975).
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In reversing the trial court's disposition, the court of appeals
held that section 404(b) should not be used to imply a private
cause of action in favor of third persons. The implication of a
remedy in this circumstance, the court contended, would expand
unjustifiably the purpose of the Act, especially in light of adequate
state remedies available to Mrs. Mason.' The court declined to
comment on the credence of plaintiff's claim based upon these
remedies and remanded the case to the trial court for their dis-
position.
The Mason court's resolution of the nonpassenger's claim should
reduce the potential of third party actions in oversales situations
based upon the Act." The decision, however, does not affect the
issue presented in Nader of liability to nonpassengers based upon
common-law grounds. The court of appeals' prescription in Nader
regarding such claims will pose problems; the distinction between
an identifiable class of potential passengers who can recover and
the indeterminate class constituting the public at large may be illu-
sive. In light of the absence of a privity requirement and the relative
ease of showing reliance, it is likely that the airlines will be forced
to confront claims by nonpassengers based upon the bumping of a
ticket holder."
55 543 F.2d at 219. The Mason court utilized the criteria enumerated by the
Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), in reaching this conclusion.
See Part H infra.
"This conclusion is not clearcut, however. It is possible that a court could
conclude that a private remedy should be inferred in favor of a nonpassenger in
order to effect the goal of reducing substantial oversales. The recent actions of the
CAB give some credence to this argument. See Part I-E infra.
67 The court of appeals in Nader stated that Allegheny had no "special reason"
to know of CCAG's reliance or even of its existence. 512 F.2d at 548. This lan-
guage is derived from Dean Prosser's analysis of the problem of third party li-
ability for misrepresentation. See Prosser, Misrepresentation and Third Persons,
19 VAND. L. REV. 231, 251-52 (1966). According to Prosser, an unidentified third
person can recover for a fraudulent misrepresentation if the defendant has a
special reason to expect a member of his class to be reached and influenced by
it. In the context of air travel, knowledge of inconvenience and potential damages
on the part of third persons, especially close relatives, arguably can be inferred
each time a person is bumped. Based upon Nader, future plaintiffs in similar cir-
cumstances will certainly maintain that airline defendants have special reason to
know of their alleged plights. If courts reject this argument on the ground of po-
tentialy indeterminate liability, plaintiffs may be able to argue that a passenger's
explanation of a particular need to obtain a seat constitutes sufficient notice to
create the requisite knowledge of a special reason. Adoption of this argument
would also pose serious problems for air carriers. Certainly, determining when a
"special reason" exists sufficient to create liability to third persons will be an
issue soon facing the courts.
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E. Punitive Damages
Another of the potentially startling results of the trial court's
decision in Nader was the award of punitive damages, apparently
under both the statutory and common-law theories. 8 The lower
court indicated in reaching its conclusion that it intended to "pun-
ish" the tort-feasor for an "outrageous act." Its holding amounted
to such punishment-in essence the court found that failure to dis-
close overbooking practices per se constitutes a sufficient basis to
award punitive damages." Again, the court of appeals reversed the
trial court determination, but the prospect of potential punitive
damages remains. Additionally, given the viability of common-law
and statutory remedies, differing standards for the applicability of
punitive damages exist.
Although it reversed the award of punitive damages for violation
of section 404(b), the court of appeals did acknowledge that they
can be awarded if the requisite elements under the federal com-
mon law are met, i.e., evidence of intentional wrongdoing or con-
scious disregard of the passenger's rights.6" As a practical matter,
however, the court indicated that a circumscribed approach should
be taken. In part, this circumscribed attitude toward punitive dam-
ages vis-a-vis the statutory claim under section 404(b) is attribut-
able to the court's rejection of the deterrent value of punitive dam-
ages relied upon the district court. 1
51 Only Nader recovered on both theories. 365 F. Supp. at 132.
The trial court stated in its conclusions of law:
Since the Defendant herein intentionally engaged in substantial
over-selling, and intentionally did not inform the public of this prac-
tice and the attendant risks, and intentionally sought to conceal such
information from all its passengers and particularly from the vic-
tims of this practice, it is clear that the Defendants acted not only
wantonly but with malice. They are, therefore, liable to both plain-
tiffs for punitive damages for their misrepresentation.
id. at 133.
60 512 F.2d at 549-50. The determination as to whether exemplary damages
can be assessed for violation of S 404(b) depends not on local law but on gen-
eral federal common law. Lakeshore & M.S.R. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101 (1893).
On the other hand, where a common-law claim is made, the Erie doctrine sug-
gests local law should be utilized to determine if punitive damages should be
awarded. See generally C. MCCORMICK, HORNBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES
§ 3 (1935).
"The court of appeals indicated that punitive damages serve a twofold pur-
pose: punishment for outrageous conduct and deterrence from engaging in the
same or similar acts. 512 F.2d at 549.
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The court of appeals repudiated the trial judge's approach be-
cause such an award was seen as an interference with the primary
jurisdiction of the CAB. The court indicated that the award of
punitive damages in such circumstances constitutes implicit regula-
tion by the judiciary, a regulation which is contrary to congres-
sional delegation to the regulatory agency." Moreover, the court
expressly rejected the interpretation of some previous decisions
which suggested that the existence of substantial oversales per se
demonstrates malice."
Similarly, the court rejected the award of punitive damages
based upon misrepresentation. Significantly, it did not accept the
inference of the trial court that because the airline was a common
carrier, a fiduciary duty of full disclosure was created, the breach
of which gives rise to the conclusion that the airline willfully dis-
regarded the interests of the passenger." The court did not pre-
clude, however, the possibility of exemplary damages if malice is
demonstrated.'
The continued potential for punitive damages resulting from the
bumping of a passenger is amply demonstrated by the recent
62 Id. at 550-51.
63 Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360, 367-68 (S.D. Cal.
1961), had declared that deliberate overselling constituted malicious or willful
and wanton conduct sufficient to justify an award of punitive damages. Subsequent
decisions have indicated that overbooking per se does not justify punitive dam-
ages, but substantial overselling is evidence of malice. See, e.g., Archibald v. Pan
Am. World Airways, Inc., 460 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1972).
6 The trial court had stated:
The Defendant Allegheny Airlines is a common carrier which is
licensed or authorized to do business by the Civil Aeronautics
Board, as hereinbefore stated, and is the holder of a certificate of
public convenience and necessity. As such it has a public duty and
an especially large and high fiduciary obligation to make its policies
known to all of its customers with regard to its intentional over-
booking. The fact that it conceals such practices in its advertising
and otherwise, and, by virtue of its failure and refusal to take rea-
sonable steps to avoid harm to the Plaintiffs herein is tantamount
to willful and wanton misconduct which gives rise to and provides
a proper basis for each of the Plaintiffs' claims for damages.
365 F. Supp. at 132. The court of appeals in rejecting this approach stated:
"[W]e cannot accept the notion that air carriers ipso facto become fiduciaries
and are held to a standard of full disclosure to the public merely because they
possess a certificate of public convenience and necessity." 512 F.2d at 551.
1 The court remanded for a determination of whether Allegheny's practices
were deceptive, and if so, whether the airline had a good-faith defense. 512 F.2d
at 552. The Supreme Court noted that the disposition of the punitive damages
issues was not before it. 426 U.S. at 308 n.19.
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opinion of a Texas federal district court in Smith v. Piedmont.'
In Smith, the defendant airline denied a seat to the plaintiff and
seven others holding confirmed reservations. Following the orders
of the local supervisors, the airline's agent disregarded the pre-
scribed priority rules based upon time of booking and loaded the
aircraft on a first-come-first-serve basis. Having been denied a
seat, the plaintiff was forced to take an alternate flight and thereby
missed a rehearsal dinner for a wedding in which he was to
participate. Additionally, the court found that the passenger was
subjected to discourteous treatment by the airline agents. Plaintiff
sued, alleging, inter alia, violation of section 404(b). In these
circumstances, the court concluded that the plaintiff was entitled
not only to compensatory damages but also to punitive damages for
the humiliation and mental distress suffered as a result of his treat-
ment at the hands of the agents who acted in knowing disregard
of the airline's priority rules."
The prescription derived from these cases is clear. Not only
must airlines follow their priority rules, but they must also insure
that local agents responsible for their implementation act with
courtesy and circumspection in dealing with potential plaintiffs.
Punitive damages may be found on both common-law and statu-
tory grounds where the court is able to point to acts which can be
labeled "outrageous," and the level of overbooking is a factor in
determining if the requisite malice is present. Moreover, the danger
of large awards in such circumstances is also exacerbated by the
trend of courts, toward allowing compensation for the infliction of
mental distress. Therefore, the short-sighted and discourteous be-
havior of an agent dealing with passengers in a boarding area may
result in a potentially substantial liability to the air carrier.
F. The Response of the Civil Aeronautics Board to the Denied
Boarding Controversy
The present denied boarding compensation regulations em-
bodied in 14 C.F.R. Part 250 were implemented in 1967 and
represent only the most recent codification of a long history of
"412 F. Supp. 641 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
The Smith court found that the defendant had violated § 404(b). It con-
cluded, however, that the failure to disclose the possibility of overbooking did
not constitute either common-law fraud or a violation of the Texas Deceptive
Practices Act. Id. at 643.
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CAB concern with the oversales situation. 8 As discussed briefly
above,"9 this remedy basically mandates the filing of priority rules
with the CAB and the establishment of compensation levels as
well as criteria for reimbursement and reporting requirements.
This procedure was designed to eliminate potential abuse in
three important ways."' First, the rules seek to deter excessive
overbooking by providing a monetary remedy to the passenger.
Second, the rules establish specific procedures, for determining
which passengers will board. Finally, they require a written ex-
planation to the passenger in the case of bumping. Additionally,
the Nader decision itself adds another protection: violation of an
airline's priority rules can give rise to a private cause of action
under section 404(b).
The cutbacks of service which accompanied the oil crisis in 1973
elicited renewed CAB interest in reservation practices. In January
1974, the CAB gave notice of a proposed rule-making contemplat-
ing procedures relating to emergency reservation practices. 1 At
the hearing on these practices, an intervener raised the question
of the legality of intentional overbooking. In its resulting opinion,
however, the CAB indicated that the specific issues before the
court in the Nader case were not addressed in that CAB proceed-
ing, and it specifically did not determine whether deliberate over-
selling was a deceptive practice."
In April 1976, the CAB announced a proposed rulemaking
proceeding with respect to deliberate overbooking practices.' In
announcing reexamination of its policy towards overbooking, the
CAB's explanatory statement indicated that the quid pro quo for
6 "See note 6 supra. See generally 34 J. AIR L. & CoM. 127 (1968).
"See text accompanying note 10 supra.
70 512 F.2d at 536.
71 The CAB was interested in curtailing the problem of no shows resulting
from multiple booking and other abuses by passengers. It proposed establishing
ticket time limits to retain confirmed reservations, imposing refund penalties on
"no show" passengers, and increasing denied boarding compensation by 300%.
Emergency Reservations Practices Investigation; Order Instituting Investigation,
Tentative Findings and Conclusions; and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 39
Fed. Reg. 823 (1974).
" Emergency Reservation Practices Investigation, CAB Order No. 76-4-55,
cited in 426 U.S. at 297 n.8.
" Priority Rules, Denied-Boarding Compensation Tariffs And Reports of Un-
accommodated Passengers: Reexamination of the Board's Policies Concerning
Deliberate Overbooking and Oversales, 41 Fed. Reg. 16,478 (1976).
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the adoption of overbooking rules was the effort of air carriers to
curb oversales. The CAB stated that while there had been a dra-
matic lowering of the rate of oversales following the implementa-
tion of the present regulations, recent years reflected a trend toward
a higher rate. According to the CAB, this trend necessitated a re-
evaluation of the established procedures.'4
In its request for comments, the CAB focused on a number of
issues upon which it sought advice. First, it requested comments
on whether it should issue a policy statement defining overbooking
as an unfair practice under section 411. The CAB recognized that
if deliberate overbooking was proscribed, some action must be
available to the carriers to cope with the problems of "no shows"
and reservation turnovers. In its solicitation of comments, the
CAB posited two suggestions: (1) offering conditional reservations
to passengers seeking seats on fully booked flights, or (2) guar-
anteeing reservations for passengers with definite assurance against
overbooking at the price of an additional charge or with a "no-
show" penalty. '
Hypothesizing that overbooking is not found an unfair or de-
ceptive practice, the CAB sought comment regarding the appro-
priateness of the present procedure. From this premise, the ex-
planatory statement solicited comments as to the appropriateness
of an increased level of denied boarding compensation or other
changes such as limitation on the interchangeability of tickets
between carriers. Additionally the CAB sought comment as to
whether carriers should be required to disclose their overbooking
practices to passengers."6
14 According to the data presented in the CAB's Explanatory Statement, the
number of persons denied space decreased from a high of 10.0 per 10,000 en-
planements in 1968 to 4.6 per 10,000 in 1973. In 1974, the number increased to
5.8 per 10,000, and in 1975 to 6.0 per 10,000. The CAB also noted that the num-
ber of complaints received by its Office of the Consumer Advocate reflected a
need to reevaluate. Id.
75 Id. at 16,479.
7 1 In 1965, the CAB had proposed a rule requiring carriers to notify individual
passengers of overbooked conditions twelve hours prior to the scheduled departure
time. Passenger Priorities and Overbooked Flights: Notice of Proposed Rule
Making, 30 Fed. Reg. 13,236 (1965). This proposal was abandoned in 1967.
See Priority Rules, Denied Boarding Compensation Tariffs, And Reports of Un-
accommodated Passengers: Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 32 Fed. Reg. 459,
460-61 (1967). This abandonment, however, does not mean that a notice re-
quirement may not be imposed. The CAB has approved an approach originally
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At present these procedures remain speculative and the CAB's
process of reviewing alternatives continues." The expanded vulner-
ability of air carriers to court action based upon section 404(b) of
the Act as well as common-law remedies may result in increased
pressure upon the CAB to evolve a satisfactory compromise.
II. THE VIABILITY OF PRIVATE REMEDIES UNDER THE
FEDERAL AVIATION ACT
As discussed above, the court of appeals in Nader v. Allegheny
Airlines, Inc., summarily concluded that a private remedy exists
pursuant to section 404(b) for a passenger denied boarding while
holding a confirmed reservation. This conclusion does not mean,
however, that a court will infer a private remedy under section
404 or under provisions of the Act in other factual situations."
Indeed, according to a number of recent decisions examining this
question, the existence of private remedies under a statutory act
involves examination of several criteria undiscussed in the Nader
opinion. The question of private remedies under the provisions of
the Act may well be in the forefront of aviation litigation in the
area of carrier-passenger relations within the near future.
On two occasions in the past two years the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit has examined claimed private remedies for pur-
ported violations of sections of the Act. In Polansky v. Trans World
suggested by Eastern Airlines involving the establishment of a third type of
ticket-leisure class. See Delta Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 455 F.2d 1340, 1342 (D.C.
Cir. 1971) (affirming CAB Order No. 71-6-120). Under this plan the ticket is
conditional, i.e., if seating remains after all other persons are aboard, the ticket
holder would be accommodated. In its opinion, the Supreme Court also suggested
that a notice requirement might be fulfilled if the practice were detailed in the
airline's tariff. 426 U.S. 306 n.14.
" The CAB deferred consideration of issues concerning past treatment of
overbooking raised by the court of appeals in Nader until the Supreme Court
could examine them. 41 Fed. Reg. at 16,479 n.8. The CAB has also suggested
that new regulations be issued regarding overbooking on charter flights. Remedies
For Charter Overbooking By Carriers: Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
41 Fed. Reg. 47,494 (1976).
78 See, e.g., Mason v. Belieu, 543 F.2d 215 (D.C. Cir. 1976), in which the
court reversed a plaintiff's judgment in favor of a nonpassenger who alleged vio-
lation of § 404(b) when her husband was bumped from defendant's flight; Moun-
gey v. Brandt, 250 F. Supp. 445 (W.D. Wis. 1966), in which the court refused
to imply a private remedy for violation of safety regulations where the plaintiff
was injured when the private plane in which he was traveling crashed. See gen-
erally 34 J. AIR L. & CoM. 183 (1968).
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Airlines, Inc.," plaintiffs were members of a European tour spon-
sored by the defendant airline. The travel agency involved was
also named as a defendant. It was alleged that the defendants had
falsely advertised so as to fraudulently induce the plaintiffs to
participate in a tour during which numerous problems with ground
accommodations were encountered."0 According to the plaintiffs,
these wrongs could be redressed by implying private causes of
action pursuant to section 404(b) and section 411 of the Act.
The trial court dismissed the claims, and the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal, rejecting the purported
claims arising from violations of the Act. The methodology of
the court in reaching these conclusions will be important in similar
future claims and must be analyzed in light of the Nader decision.
In reaching its conclusions, the Polansky court focused on the
recent decision of the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash.8' While the
Cort decision is not factually apposite," the Court enumerated
certain prerequisites to implying a private cause of action from a
federal statute. According to Justice Brennan, writing for a unani-
mous Court, four factors must be examined in determining whether
a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing
one:8" (1) whether the plaintiff is a member of the class for whose
special benefit the statute was created; (2) whether there is any
indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, to create or
deny a private remedy; (3) whether implication of a private
remedy is consistent with the underlying purposes of the legisla-
tive scheme; and (4) whether the cause of action is one tradition-
ally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the
state's, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action
based solely upon federal law.
Applying the Cort criteria to the Federal Aviation Act, the
79 523 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1975).
8oPlaintiffs alleged that their "first-class" accommodations were inferior to
some tourist accommodations, that arranged travel services were inadequate, that
reservations were broken or not honored, and that guides and hostesses were
not available as promised. Id. at 333.
81422 U.S. 66 (1975).
82 Cort involved a claim for injunctive relief and damages by a stockholder
against a corporation based upon a criminal statute prohibiting corporations from
contributing to federal elections.
422 U.S. at 77-80.
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Polansky court initially indicated that it would be a mistake to
assume that the implication of a private remedy for some categories
of conduct ipso facto implies a private cause of action for other
types of conduct under the same provisions. Accordingly, deter-
mining whether a private remedy exists for a particular conduct
is necessarily an ad hoc decision."
The Polansky court examined the purported violations alleged
by the plaintiffs and found that the Act did not imply a private
cause of action through which the plaintiffs could seek redress.
First, the court acknowledged that the plaintiffs were air passengers
and within a class sought to be protected by the Act. It found,
however, that the plaintiffs did not suffer the type of harm that
the statute was designed to prevent. The underlying premise of
this conclusion was that Congress intended the Act to provide
access to air facilities and to proscribe discriminatory interference
from such access by the air carrier." Second, according to the
court, the legislative history of section 404(b) shed little light on
the problem of implying a private remedy, but the overall legisla-
tive scheme militated for denying the right in the plaintiff's cir-
cumstances. Finally, the court indicated that it would be appro-
priate to relegate the plaintiffs to the remedies available through
state law."8
The court also rejected claims of a private remedy based upon
violation of section 411 of the Act without even invoking the
Cort v. Ash analysis. The court noted that private remedies have
never been found under section 411 by any court." This can be
attributed in part to dicta in Pan American Airways v. United
States,' in which the Supreme Court suggested that section 411,
like section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act after which it
is patterned, does not contemplate a private remedy, but only
vindication of public interest. Accordingly, the Polansky court held
the plaintiffs could not bring suit for violation of section 411.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reiterated both its conclu-
8'The Polansky court stated: "In our view, each new category of conduct
alleged to violate 5 1374(b) must be tested against the standards stated by the
Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash, supra." 523 F.2d at 335.
85d. at 335-36.
l Id. at 337.
"I1d. at 339.
88 371 U.S. 296 (1963).
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sions and its methodology a year after Polansky in Wolf v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc.," which involved circumstances analogous to
the earlier decision. Plaintiffs in Wolf were participants in mini-
plans involving flights to European cities, hotel accommodations,
and other incidental services. Pursuant to the arrangement, dis-
count cards were issued for participants to stay in certain guest
houses. Upon their arrival in Europe the participants discovered
that in some cases the guest houses were situated 350 miles from
the advertised city. As a result, all the plaintiffs had to forfeit their
discount vouchers. The participants in the mini-plans sued the de-
fendant airline, asserting a right to recover under section 403 (b)"0
and 411 of the Act.
The Wolf court summarily dismissed the claim based upon sec-
tion 411 of the Act by recitation of the Polansky decision." Re-
garding the claim based upon section 403(b), the court again
turned to the Cort v. Ash criteria and found that the prerequisites
for a private remedy could not be met. The court borrowed sub-
stantially from its earlier decision in Polansky regarding the pur-
pose of the Act and the availability of state remedies. Additionally,
the court concluded that the plaintiffs were not the beneficiaries of
the section because it prohibited air carriers from receiving any
compensation greater, less, or different from the rates specified m
the currently effective tariff, and the putative plaintiffs were only
damaged because they paid more than the tariff."
The opinions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia in Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc.,
may have an important effect on the application of the Cort v. Ash
analysis, as well as the resultant conclusion in fact patterns such
as Polansky and Wolf. The emphasis on the legislative scheme
89 544 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3600 (Mar. 8,
1977).
"Section 403(b)(1), 49 U.S.C. § 1373(b)(1) (Supp. V 1975) provides, in
pertinent part:
No air carrier of [sic] foreign air carrier or any ticket agent shall
charge or demand or collect or receive a greater or less or different
compensation for air transportation, or for any service in connec-
tion therewith, than the rates, fares, and charges specified in then
currently effective tariffs of such air carrier or foreign air car-
rier . ...
91544 F.2d at 136.
91 Id. at 137.
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underlying the Act which was emphasized by the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit in these cases contrasts sharply with the
summary recognition of a private remedy in Nader. While the
factual circumstances are distinguishable and the methodologies
of the courts differ, they may not be sufficiently disparate to justify
the dramatically opposite conclusions. As more courts recognize
private remedies, the impact of the second and third Cort criteria
which focus on legislative background emphasized by Polansky and
Wolf will correspondingly be diluted. 3 Indeed, the court of appeals
in Nader did not mention the legislative intent of section 404. In
light of the apparent narrow original scope of this section, the
Nader approach and its disregard of legislative intent may portend
an expanded view of the section's, and perhaps the Act's, applic-
ability vis-a-vis private litigants."
Similarly, the Nader court's recognition of both common-law
and private statutory remedies suggests a dilution of the fourth Cort
criterion, the availability of state remedies. While the Supreme
Court did not have to address the issue of the applicability of a
statutory remedy, its resolution of the Nader case means that
plaintiffs can sue under both the Act and common-law theories.
In summary, it appears that the industry can anticipate a pro-
liferation of claims in which a passenger seeks to avail himself of
a private remedy under some section of the Act. Given the dicta
of the Supreme Court, it is not likely that section 411, potentially
the most far-reaching provision, will soon be recognized as imply-
ing a private remedy. An evolutionary process, however, leading
to an expansion of the statutory bases upon which courts will infer
private remedies can be anticipated,"3 as well as a corresponding
13 Additionally, if courts reached differing results, the need for a common ap-
proach to aviation problems will militate for recognition of private remedies and
the evolution of uniform law. See 34 J. AIR L. & COM. 133, 135 (1968).
94 But see Mason v. Belieu, 543 F.2d 215 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
"' The potential for a quantum increase in air carrier vulnerability can be
appreciated by analogy to the development of private causes of action under the
Securities and Exchange Act. In J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964),
the Supreme Court found an implied federal remedy for violation of § 14(a),
15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970), regarding proxy statements and solicitations based
thereon. Subsequently, the Court found that the prevailing party in such a statu-
tory action could recover attorneys' fees. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396
U.S. 375 (1969). Although the Third Circuit in Polansky v. Trans World Air-
lines, Inc., 523 F.2d at 337, expressly distinguished J.I. Case Co. v. Borak based
upon the differing purposes of the Securities and Exchange Act and the Federal
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expansion of the factual situations in which a private remedy will
be afforded.
III. THE LIMITS OF AIR CARRIER LIABILITY IN NEGLIGENCE
TO ITS PASSENGERS
Despite varying articulations, it is generally recognized that an
airline engaged in transporting passengers for hire is a common
carrier and owes them a higher degree of care than normally re-
quired under traditional tort standards."' This does not mean, how-
ever, that the carrier is an insurer of the passenger's welfare."7
Rather, the basis for recovery is negligence."' The application of
this principle to ascertain common carrier status and to determine
Aviation Act, the potential for a parallel evolution of private remedies nonethe-
less exists.
11 Among the various articulations of an air carrier's duty are: "the highest
degree of care consistent with the practical operation of the plane and protection
of its passengers from injuries"; the highest degree of practical care and diligence
consistent with the mode of transportation and the normal prosecution of its
business"; "the highest degree of care, foresight, prudence and diligence reason-
ably demanded at any given time by the conditions or circumstances then affect-
ing its passengers"; "the highest practical degree of care for their safety." Some
states, notably New York, require only a "reasonable standard of care." Others
phrase the standard in terms of a high degree of care. See 1 L. KREINDLER, Avi-
ATION ACCIDENT LAW § 3.07 (1971). See also W. PROSSER, LAW OF ToRTs § 34
(4th ed. 1971).
117A number of recent cases illustrate that an airline will not be found culpable
for alleged injuries merely because the plaintiff was a passenger. In National
Airlines, Inc. v. Edwards, 336 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 1976), the court rejected plain-
tiff's claims for injuries allegedly resulting from the consumption of food and
beverages in Cuba following a hijacking. The court found that this constituted
an intervening cause sufficient to break the requisite chain of causation. Similarly,
in Kelly v. American Airlines, Inc., 508 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1975), the court
upheld the defendant's judgment on the basis that res ipsa loquitor was inapplica-
ble and plaintiff had failed to sustain her burden of proof that she was injured
as a result of defendant's negligence in avoiding or failing to warn of air turbu-
lence. See also Freedman v. Transworld Airlines, Inc., 336 So. 2d 323 (Fla. App.
1976), in which the court found no liability on the part of the carrier for assault
and false arrest when its agents physically removed an hysterical passenger from
the aircraft.
"See L. KRIENDLER, supra note 96, at S 3.06. This rule applies only to pas-
sengers for hire. An issue which may see development in the future involves the
question of carrier liability under trip passes which routinely include exculpatory
clauses. Decisions have upheld such limitations on the basis that the injured par-
ties were gratuitous licensees and that the airline was liable only for willful or
wanton injury. See Braughton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 137 (W.D.
Mo. 1960); Sims v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 269 F. Supp. 272 (S.D. Fla. 1967).
Whether such limitations will be upheld in the future or found to be against
public policy as impermissible exculpation of tort liability is an open question.
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the requisite standard of care is not a simple task for courts.
The focus here will not be on the broad front of this confronta-
tion, but rather on one particular aspect of it which has seen sig-
nificant recent development. Specifically, it will pertain to the issue
of the extent of the airline's special duty in geographical terms,
i.e., when and where does the duty of the air carrier begin, how-
ever it is formulated. While it is clear that a passenger injured on
board an aircraft, or when actually ascending to or descending
from an aircraft, comes under the protective umbrella of the
common carrier rule, it is not so apparent when the duty attaches
and when it terminates. In examining this issue, cases will be con-
sidered which arise in two contexts-under the common law and
under the Warsaw Convention.
A. The Parameters of Common-Law Liability
The conceptual basis for expanded liability for common carriers
is a special relationship imposed by law for protecting individuals
who have committed themselves into the hands of the carrier for
transportation.' Logically, therefore, the determinative factor in
ascertaining if a common carrier's duty has arisen is whether pas-
senger status is actually attained. This, however, is not as straight-
forward an inquiry as it might seem. From a narrow perspective,
that relationship is established as a matter of law only when a con-
tract of carriage is agreed upon. Yet courts have long held that
the purchase of a ticket is not a prerequisite for establishing the
carrier-passenger relationship.2' °
"'See, e.g., Carroll v. Staten Island R.R., 58 N.Y. 126 (1874). In the present
context, it should be noted that this expanded duty encompasses not only poten-
tial liability for the acts of agents, but also for the acts of others. Thus, the
carrier has a duty to protect passengers from the acts of third parties. See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314(a) (1965). See generally Harper & Kime,
The Duty to Control the Conduct of Another, 43 YALE L.J. 886 (1934).
10 Historically, the relationship has been broadly defined as contractual, but
courts have examined the attainment of passenger status from a variety of per-
spectives and used a variety of approaches to show the establishment of the re-
lationship. Thus, some cases concluded people waiting to board a common car-
rier are passengers. See, e.g., Schindler v. Southern Coach Lines, Inc., 188 Tenn.
169, 217 S.W.2d 775 (1948). Other courts have focused on the time when a
person puts himself in the care of the carrier. See, e.g., Chicago & E. Ill. R.R.
v. Jennings, 190 Ill. 478, 60 N.E. 818 (1901). Other courts have focused on the
intent of the potential passenger. See, e.g., Rawlings v. Wabash R.R., 97 Mo.
App. 515, 71 S.W. 534 (1903). Other courts have relied on an implied contract
theory. See, e.g., Roberts v. Yellow Cab Co., 240 A.2d 733 (Me. 1968).
Even if the duty of a common carrier is not applied, the duty of reasonable
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In 1974 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit applied a
different, flexible approach to determining whether passenger
status had been obtained so as to invoke the common carrier's
duty of care. In Suarez v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,"' the plaintiff
was refused a ticket by the air carrier's agent because the credit
card offered for payment bore only her husband's name. Plaintiff,
who had recently been hospitalized and was attempting to fly home,
was delayed for two hours and allegedly subjected to abusive treat-
ment. She thereafter suffered a heart attack. In the negligence
action against the airline, the trial court instructed the jury that
the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of ordinary care. The
Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the plaintiff had obtained
passenger status and that under the applicable state law, the carrier
owed her the highest duty of care.
In reaching that conclusion, the court enunciated a five-element
test, one originally envolved by the Washington State Supreme
Court,"n to determine if the plaintiff was actually a passenger. The
elements of that test as recited by the Suarez court are as follows:
The matters to be considered in determining the status as a pas-
senger are: (1) place (a place under the control of the carrier
and provided for the use of persons who are about to enter carriers
conveyance); (2) time (a reasonable time before the time to enter
the conveyance); (3) intention (a genuine intention to take pas-
sage upon carriers conveyance); (4) control (a submission to the
directions, express or implied, of the carrier); and (5) knowledge
(a notice to carrier either that the person is actually prepared to
take passage or that person awaiting passage may reasonably be
expected at the time and place)."
The actual application of these principles by the Suarez court
has been criticized on the basis that the court in fact examined only
care may exist so as to impose liability for injuries arising away from the aircraft
in the vicinity of the terminal. See, e.g., Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Millirons, 87
Ga. App. 334, 73 S.E.2d 598 (1952); Crowell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 240
N.C. 20, 81 S.E.2d 178 (1954); Marshall v. United Airlines, 35 Cal. App. 3d
84, 110 Cal. Rptr. 416 (1973).
1498 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1974).
101Zorotovich v. Washington Toll Bridge Auth., 80 Wash. 2d 106, 491 P.2d
1295 (1971). The Illinois Supreme Court had adopted the Zorotovich test in a
non-airlines, common carrier situation in Katamay v. Chicago Transit Auth., 53
Ill. 2d 27, 289 N.E.2d 623 (1972).
103498 F.2d at 616.
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the control issue.'" Moreover, the court did not confront the issue
of whether the air carrier in fact breached its duty. In the present
context, however, the case is significant because it raises the possi-
bility of a substantial extension of liability beyond the physical
proximity of the aircraft."° Additionally, the utilization of a flexible
approach which requires examination of numerous criteria pre-
cludes a clear prescription of the potential extent of the carrier's
liability. Thus, while some nexus with the aircraft is clearly re-
quired, prediction as to whether a special duty exists as to a poten-
tial passenger is problematical.
B. Liability Under the Warsaw Convention
Recent decisions under the Warsaw Convention"' likewise sug-
gest the evolution of a flexible approach to determining whether
passenger status has been obtained in order to determine whether
liability inheres. As in the common-law setting, this evolution has
already meant some expansion in carrier liability and portends
further expansion. Additionally, such a flexible approach poses
problems in predicting results and makes legal recommendations
hazardous.
Pursuant to Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention as modified
by the Montreal Agreement,"' an air carrier is absolutely liable to
a limit of $75,000.00 per passenger for injuries sustained as the
result of an accident. Specifically, Section 17 provides:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of
death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury
suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage
so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of
any of the operations of embarking or disembarkingY"
Thus, the Convention specifically enumerates the circumstances
104See 40 J. Am L. & COM. 723, 729 (1974); see also Comment, The Stan-
dard of Care Required of Airlines in Terminals, 60 IowA L. REV. 710 (1975).
11 Suarez has subsequently been cited with approval by at least one court.
See Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Dixon, 310 So. 2d 336 (Fla. App. 1975).
101 The correct title is The Convention for Unification of Certain Rules Re-
lating to International Transportation by Air, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137
L.N.T.S. 11 (1936).
107 44 C.A.B. 819 (1966). See generally Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United
States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REv. 497 (1967).
1-849 U.S.C. S 1502 (1970).
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in which an air carrier is absolutely liable. A number of cases
interpreting this provision have held that accidents to passengers
within terminals were not encompassed under this provision. '
Recently, however, cases involving terrorist attacks within terminal
facilities have resulted in a reexamination of the scope of Article
17.110
The initial focal point of the cases involving terrorist activity
under Article 17 of the Convention involved whether such acts
constituted "accidents." That issue appears to have been settled by
the decision in Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co.,"1' which held
that a hijacking was an "accident" under the Convention provi-
sions. Since that time, the focus has shifted to the issue of whether
the "accident" occurred "in the course of any operations of em-
barking or disembarking."
The first recent decision to examine this clause and expand the
scope of its coverage was Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc."' Day
arose as the result of an August 1973 attack at Hellenikon Airport
in Athens, Greece, by two Palestinian terrorists, in which grenades
and small arms fire were directed into a line of passengers prepar-
ing to board defendant's flight to New York City. At the time of
the occurrence the passengers had proceeded through check-in
counters, deposited their luggage, completed passport and currency
inspections, and descended into a lounge for the exclusive use of
international boarders. From the lounge in which the attack
occurred, passengers gained access to the aircraft by walking out-
side the terminal, crossing a terrace, and taking a bus to the
departure area.
In Day, plaintiffs alleged that the defendant was absolutely liable
10'See, e.g., MacDonald v. Air Canada, 439 F.2d 1402 (1st Cir. 1971); Klein
v. K.L.M. Royal Dutch Airlines, 46 App. Div. 2d 679, 360 N.Y.S.2d 60 (1974);
Felismina v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 13 Av. Cas. 17,145 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
"'0See generally Note, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 369 (1976).
"1 351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), afl'd mem., 485 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir.
1973). The finding that terrorist activity is an "accident" under Article 17 should
not be extrapolated to the conclusion that anything which happens on an inter-
national flight is an accident. In Scherer v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 54 App.
Div. 2d 636 (N.Y. 1976), the court rejected plaintiff's claim alleging that a throm-
bophlebitis condition had flared up as a result of a flight on the grounds that
there was no accident.
"2 393 F. Supp. 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), a/f'd, 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976).
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under the Convention for the injuries sustained by the passengers.
In these circumstances, the trial court granted summary judgment
on plaintiffs' motion. In doing so, the court explicitly rejected the
carrer's contention that the Convention ipso facto did not apply
within the terminal. Rather, the court examined the purpose and
legislative history of the Convention, in light of the language of
Article 17, and concluded as a matter of law that the injuries
occurred during the course of embarking.'13
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. In so
doing, the court noted that the determinative phraseology was
cryptic. It emphasized, however, that the purpose of the Warsaw
Convention and the history of its negotiation supported what the
court labeled the "tripartite" test applied by the district court."'
Pursuant to this test the court did not exclusively examine the loca-
tion of the plaintiffs, but rather looked to three factors: (1) activity
(what the plaintiffs were doing); (2) control (at whose direction);
and (3) location. Reviewing each of these factors, the court of
appeals agreed with the lower court that the plaintiffs were in fact
engaged in the operation of embarking, and therefore Article 17
was found applicable.
The Day opinion's tripartite test was substantially relied upon
by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Evangelinos v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc." The Evangelinos case arose from the
same terrorist attack that gave rise to Day. In Evangelinos, the
trial court found that the Warsaw Convention was inapplicable,
and it granted the carrier's motion for partial summary judgment.
In reversing, the Third Circuit agreed with the assessment of the
Day court regarding the background and purpose of the Warsaw
Convention."" The court indicated that it feared an over-emphasis
on location would lead to inconsistent results depending upon the
fortuitous position of the passenger at the time of his injury. The
court also emphasized the need to apply the Warsaw Convention
flexibly, consistent with its original purpose, but responsive to
changing circumstances."' In applying this principle, the court
"'3 393 F. Supp. at 217-20, 223.
14 528 F.2d at 33-38.
"15 396 F. Supp. 95 (W.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd, 550 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1976).
1"6 550 F.2d at 155.
1I The court strongly emphasized this point: '"o reach any other result would
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characterized terrorism as an attendant risk of modem air trans-
portation."8
Chief Judge Seitz strongly dissented, disagreeing with the adop-
tion of the approach utilized in Day."' He scrutinized the negotia-
tions underlying adoption of Article 17, and he concluded that
support did not exist for the test articulated by the majority.
Rather, he concluded that while location and activity are both
important, Article 17 presupposes some close connection with the
aircraft before the activity of the passenger should be examined.
Because the requisite nexus was not present in the Evangelinos
setting, in his opinion, Article 17 should not have been applied.
A recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
reaches a similar conclusion.
Hernandez v. Air France" arose from a terrorist attack in the
baggage retrieval area of Lod International Airport near Tel Aviv,
Israel, on May 30, 1972. Plaintiffs were members of a group of
Puerto Rican tourists who had descended movable stairs from the
defendant's aircraft to the ground and then rode or walked to the
terminal which they entered after a passport inspection. While
waiting for their luggage, three Japanese terrorist opened fire with
submachine guns and grenades. The plaintiffs subseqeuntly sued,
alleging that the airline was absolutely liable pursuant to Article
17 because they were in the operation of disembarking.
In these circumstances the federal district court held that the
attack did not occur during disembarkation." ' On appeal of this
decision, the appellants urged reexamination of the trial court's
conclusion based on the decisions in Day and Evangelinos. The
First Circuit, however, affirmed the lower court decision and re-
jected the contention that the attack occurred in the process of
disembarkation. In so doing the court specifically stated that it
was not rejecting the tripartite test of Evangelinos and Day. Rather,
the court indicated that even under this test the passenger relation-
be to freeze the Warsaw Convention in its 1929 mold, when air travel was in its
infancy, and to ignore current air travel procedures and the special risks created
by the type of violence that resulted in this tragedy." Id. at 157.
"I8 Id. at 157.
"1 Id. at 158 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting).
120545 F.2d 279 (1st Cir. 1976).
... In re Tel Aviv, 405 F. Supp. 154 (D.P.R. 1975).
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ship had terminated. Plaintiffs' activities were not controlled by the
air carrier and their location was substantially removed from the
aircraft."' Thus, the court distinguished Day and Evangelinos on
the basis that the present plaintiffs, unlike the plaintiffs in those
cases, were essentially "free agents." Additionally, the court re-
jected the notion that terrorist activity could be considered a char-
acteristic risk of air travel in the same manner as skyjacking."3
Although the Hernandez court paid lip service to the tripartite
test of Evangelinos and Day, its conclusion that this approach
would yield a consistent result does not clearly follow. Indeed,
given the differing attitudes of the Circuit Courts of Appeal re-
garding the risk involved in terrorist activity in terminals, it is
entirely possible that had Hernandez arisen in the Second or Third
Circuits the opposite result would have obtained. The First Circuit
in Hernandez in essence agreed with the dissent in Evangelinos that
a preliminary showing of some close nexus between the injury and
air travel is required.
The differing results among these cases underscore the lack of
certainty regarding the applicability of Article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention for injuries sustained away from the aircraft itself.
Even if courts agree that the tripartite test first invoked in Day
is appropriate to analyze the scope of liaiblity under Article 17,
differing application of the criteria will lead to varying results."'
122 The Hernandez court noted that both Day and Evangelinos had pointed out
that disembarkation was distinguishable from embarkation. 545 F.2d at 282 n.2.
12' The court stated: "[W]e think the risk of a random attack such as that
which gave rise to this litigation is not a risk characteristic of travel by aircraft,
but rather is a risk of living in a world such as ours." Id. at 284. Thus, the
Hernandez court agreed with the distinction between hijacking and terrorist ac-
tivity made by Chief Judge Seitz in dissent to Evangelinos. 550 F.2d at 159-60.
'" Another focal point of litigation under Article 17 involves the viability of
claims for mental injuries. Recently, some courts, in dicta, have suggested that
Article 17 contemplates compensation for such injuries, absent corresponding
physical impairment. See Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Ltd. (Husserl 11), 388
F. Supp. 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Krystal v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 403
F. Supp. 1322 (C.D. Cal. 1975). Compare Rosman v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 34 N.Y.2d 385, 358 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1974) with Burnett v. Trans World Air-
lines, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1152 (D.N.M. 1973). See generally Lowenfelds, Hi-
jackings, Warsaw, and the Problem of Psychic Trauma, I SYRACUSE INT'L L.J.
345 (1973). The issue of compensable injuries under Article 17 will continue
to be the source of litigation.
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IV. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Ascertaining a common denominator underlying the cases and
trends discussed herein is a hazardous undertaking. Indeed, the
complicated legal and factual contexts in which such decisions
arose make summation difficult. Nonetheless, it is useful to identify
what appears to be a common problem in many aviation cases-
the evolution of flexible standards for making determinations re-
garding the scope of air-carrier liability in varying circumstances.
This trend can be seen in the cases dealing wtih bumping, with
private remedies under the Federal Aviation Act in general, with
the extent of common-law negligence liability, and with the scope
of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention.
The utilization of flexible tests under which courts examine a
number of criteria to determine if a basis for liability exists is not
necessarily inappropriate. The danger of this approach, however,
is that it may lead to result-oriented opinions in which courts find
for one party or the other depending on their perception of the
appropriate allocation of risk. This conclusion may be speculative.
It is clear, however, that the evolution of such flexible tests makes
prediction more difficult and opens the door to a substantial ex-
pansion of liability. The industry and its counsel must ensure that
newly evolved standards are not manipulated, but rather applied
justly for the good of the carriers, their passengers, and the public
as a whole.
